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I.

INTRODUCTION

The liability ofsuppliers of raw materials and component parts for harm caused
by the product into which the materials have been incorporated poses difficult
questions. When the raw material or component part is clearly defective, there is no
question that the supplier is liable. Thus, where an ingredient in processed food is
contaminated or where a truck tire has a flaw that causes a blowout, the supplier of
the ingredient' or the tire2 is liable. The difficult questions arise where the
components are not inherently defective, but the finished product is defective
because it lacks a safety feature or a warning to the ultimate user. Under what
circumstances should the supplier of a raw material or component part be liable for
failure to provide the safety feature, failure to provide the warning to the consumer,
or failure to provide a warning to the assembler of the finished product of the
necessity for the safety feature or the consumer warning?
On the surface the cases often appear confused and contradictory. Consider the
following examples:

© 2002 David A. Fischer
* James Lewis Parks Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law.
1. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (Second Restatement) suggests that the supplier of raw
coffee beans that are contaminated with arsenic would be liable for harm caused by the poison.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. p (1965). As a general matter raw material suppliers
are seldom held liable. See M. Stuart Madden, Liability of Suppliers ofNatural Raw Materialsand
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability-A FirstStep Toward Sound Public Policy, 30
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281,282-86 (1997). But see Arena v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 580,589 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding supplier ofraw asbestos fibers incorporated into insulating
cement liable for harm caused by the fibers to workers who used the cement).
2. Harbor City Discount Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 438 (Ct.

App. 1979).
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The manufacturer of a quench tank to be used in a
coffee bean decaffeinating system is not required to
equip the quench tank with safety devices,3 but the
supplier of component parts for a cattle feeder can be
liable for failing to provide a cover for the trough and
auger parts of the feeder.4
0

0 The manufacturer of a hydraulic valve incorporated
into a log splitter is not liable for failure to adopt a valve
design that would have made the log splitter safer,5 but
the manufacturer of an air valve incorporated into a case
stacking machine could be liable for failure to provide
installation instructions that would have made the case
stacker safer.'
0 The seller of a replacement chain for a chitterling
cleaning machine was not liable for failure to warn that
the chain was dangerous to use with the machine because
the machine did not have a guard,7 but a manufacturer of
a diesel truck engine can be liable for failure to warn the
purchaser of the engine for use in a gasoline tank truck of
the necessity of equipping the engine with a air intake
shutoff valve if the truck is to be operated in an
environment containing volatile fumes.8
a The manufacturer of a dock lift with safety rails was
not liable because the rails created a shearing hazard
when the lift was incorporated into a material-handling
system that had rails on a catwalk that were too close to
the rails on the dock lift,9 but the manufacturer of parts
that were incorporated in a machine could be liable for
failure to warn about a risk of injury if the parts were
placed too close together in the machine."
• The manufacturer of Teflon, a plastic coating
designed for industrial and household use, is not required
to assess and warn concerning its appropriateness for use
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620 (N.J. 1996).
DeSantis v. Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1976).
Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1989).
Beauchamp v. Russell, 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1993).
Cross v. Cummins Engine Co., 993 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1993).
Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., Inc., 202 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2000).
Reed v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 851 (App. Div. 1990).
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in medical implants," but the manufacturer of a multipurpose push button electrical switch can be liable for
failure to warn the purchaser of the switch for use in a
Tumblast machine that metallic dust produced by the
machine 12 can cause the button to malfunction by
sticking.

Courts have been reluctant to hold raw material or component suppliers liable
for failure to warn or to protect against flaws in the finished product. Most cases
raising this issue do not impose liability on the supplier of the component or raw
material.'" We shall see that this reluctance is justifiable. The difficulty, then, is
identifying the relatively rare cases where the supplier of a product's part should be
held responsible for deficiencies in the finished product. The cases presenting this
very difficult issue are so diverse that it is very unlikely that a bright-line rule could
ever be developed that would easily resolve all such cases in an appropriate manner.
Yet, there are principles that provide helpful guidance in resolving questions arising
in this difficult area of law. The purpose of this commentary is to point out the
principles that are most helpful in resolving this difficult issue.
I.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

There is a debate in the United States about the purpose of the tort system.
Some scholars claim that the tort system is primarily concerned with achieving
efficiency through appropriate deterrence.' 4 Others claim that the goal is to achieve
corrective justice.' 5 Many courts and scholars recognize some merit in both goals,

I1. Klemv. E.I. DuPont deNemours Co., 19 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1994). Fora detailed discussion
of the temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implant litigation, see Brett W. Roubal, Note, Protecting
Suppliers of Safe ComponentPartsand Raw Materials Through the Component PartDoctrineand

the SophisticatedPurchaserDoctrine: In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Products
Liability Litigation, 31 CREIGHTONL. REV. 617 (1998).
12. Speer v. Wheelabrator Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Kan. 1993).
13. 2 DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN & MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS

LIABILITY § 19:2, at 352-355 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter MADDEN& OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY].

14. Richard Posner first explained the tort system "in ... terms of economic analysis,"
contending that efficient allocation ofresources requires appropriate deterrence of accidents. Gary
T. Schwartz, Mixed TheoriesofTortLaw: AffirmingBoth Deterrenceand CorrectiveJustice,75 TEX.
L.REV. 1801, 1806 (1997); see also Richard A. PosnerA Theory ofNegligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
32-33 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Killingor Wounding To ProtectaPropertyInterest, 14J.L.&ECON.
201, 209 (1971); Many other scholars have joined Posner in engaging in economic analysis of tort
cases. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987) (offering a

comprehensive analysis ofaccident law from the economic perspective); Guido Calabresi, Concerning
Cause andthe Law of Torts: An EssayforHarryKalven,Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975) (analyzing
causation in terms of deterrence, spreading, and distributional goals).
15. Aristotle first advanced the "notion of corrective justice". Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law
as CorrectiveJustice: A PragmaticJustificationforJuryAdjudication,
88 MICH. L. REV. 2348,2350
(1990). The objective is to nullify gains and losses that arise between persons when one person
wrongfully injures the other. Id. at 2350, 2355. Many scholars in recent years have emphasized
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yet the two goals sometimes conflict. When they do, courts valuing both goals are
faced with the difficult task of choosing between them in implementing tort policy.
In an insightful article, Gary Schwartz pointed out that the competing rationales
often coincide. 6 When this occurs, the decision making process is greatly
simplified. If both goals point to the same result, the choice to implement that result
is natural.
It is the thesis of this commentary that courts should apply, as the normal rule,
the principle that suppliers of raw materials and component parts should be exempt
from liability unless the component or material is clearly defective. Courts should
only hold suppliers of components and materials liable for defects in the finished
product in those cases where both efficiency and fairness coincide to suggest that

result.
From an efficiency prospective, there is one concept that is particularly
powerful in analyzing the liability ofcomponentpart and raw material suppliers, the
idea that liability should be placed on the "cheapest cost avoider," the entity best
able to provide the necessary safety device or warning. In an excellent student
comment, Richard Cunningham applied this concept to the problem of allocating
responsibility to component part makers and assemblers of finished products. 7 The
basic idea is that courts optimize efficiency by placing liability on the party that is
able to discover and correct the defect in the finished product at the least cost. 8
There are cases where the cheapest cost avoider is fairly easy to identify. For
example, when one party both designed the finished product and supplied all of the
components for the finished product, it is clear that the designer, rather than the
assembler, is best able to discover and protect against design hazards. 9 At the other

correctivejustice as a rationale for tort law. See generallyPHILOSOPHIcALFoUNDATtONSOFToRTLAV
(David G. Owen ed., 1995) (providing an expansive philosophic view of tort law beginning with
Aristotle's discussionofcorrectivejustice); Symposium, CorrectiveJusticeandFormalism:The Care
One Owes One's Neighbors,77 lowA L. REv. 403 (1992) (re-examining the relationship between the
theories of formalism and corrective justice and each theory's application to tort law). Corrective
justice scholars advocate widely divergent definitions of corrective justice. See generallyJules L.
Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part , 1 LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982)
(developing "foundational" principles to be used to devise specific rules for resolving cases); Jules
L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part I, 2 LAw & PHIL. 5 (1983)
(same); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973)
(contending that causation of harm is the basis for corrective justice); George P. Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537, 543-56 (1972) (claiming that reciprocity of risk is
the basis for correctivejustice); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a MoralTheory ofNegligence Law, 2 LAw
& PHIL. 37, 43 (1983) (citing Kantian principles as a way to approach tort liability from a corrective
justice standpoint); Wells, supra, at 2353 (advocating adoption of procedures that encourage juries
to do justice in individual cases).
16. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1806.
17. Richard D. Cunningham, Comment, Apportionment Between Partmakersand Assemblers
in StrictLiability, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 544 (1982).
18. Id. at 547.
19. See DeSantis v. Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
supplier of all component parts for a cattle feeder can be liable for failing to provide a cover for the
trough and auger parts of the feeder); Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assocs., 917 F.2d 235, 248 (6th Cir.
1990) (determining that defendant, who manufactured all the components of a bridge kit and supplied
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extreme, it is clear that the manufacturer of a non-defective bolt used in an
automobile is far less able to discover and protect against the design hazards of the
automobile than is the designer and assembler of the automobile. Efficiency
compels that the component part maker be liable in the former case and be exempt
from liability in the latter case.
Happily, the above results also coincide with the conclusion suggested by
corrective justice considerations. Corrective justice focuses on the moral
responsibility of the injurer to undo the harm that she has caused to the victim. In
the former example, the degree ofparticipation of the componentpart manufacturer,
particularly in designing the finished product, provides a strong moral basis for
imposing liability on the designer. In the latter example, the tenuous and remote
connection between the bolt manufacturer and the design defect suggests a
complete lack of moral responsibility for design flaws in the finished product.2"
Because fairness and efficiency concerns coincide in these examples, the dual
policies provide a strong signal for how the cases should be decided.
Unfortunately, it is not always so easy to identify the cheapest cost avoider, as
in the two preceding examples. Making a product safe requires two things: (1)
someone must use care to discover the danger, and (2) someone must use care to
protect against the danger either by making the product safer, as by installing safety
features, or by informing the consumer so that the consumer can protect herself. In
the two preceding examples, identifying the cheapest cost avoider is simplified
because in each example the same entity can perform both tasks at the least cost.
Where one party can detect the harm at the lowest cost and another party can
protect against the harm at the lowest cost, the most efficient solution is to impose
a tort duty on the former party to detect the harm (and warn the latter party) and on
the latter party to protect against the harm.2" Mr. Cunningham refers to this as the
"joint-care case."' Beauchampv. Russell' provides an illustration ofthe joint-care
case. In Beauchamp,defendant manufactured an air valve that was used in a wide
variety of pneumatically operated machines and, in this case, was installed in a box
stacking machine.24 Plaintiff attempted to unjam the machine after it became
obstructed, and was injured when the pneumatically operated plates closed on
him.' This occurred, even though the machine had been de-energized, because of
air pressure remaining in the pneumatic lines." Plaintiff alleged that the defendant
the blueprints for the bridge, was liable for failure to properly instruct concerning the proper
construction of the bridge).
20. M. Stuart Madden, Component Partsand Raw MaterialsSellers: From the Titanic to the
NewRestatement, 26 N. KY. L. REv. 535,566 (1999). Speaking of the duty to warn, Professor Madden
states: "In terms ofcorectivejustice, the sellers of raw materials, many of which are transformed into
a seemingly limitless array of applications by downstream participants in the commercial chain, have
not, in any meaningful way, caused a plaintiff s harm." Id. at 566.
21. Cunningham, supra note 17, at 552-557.
22. Id. at 553.
23. 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
24. Id. at 1193.

25. Id. at 1194-95
26. Id. at 1194, n.2 and accompanying text.
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should have warned the designer and assembler of the box stacker of the valve's
dangerous propensity to activate de-energized machinery, and that it should have
given instructions about installing the valve so that the stacker plates would have
returned to the neutral position rather than the closed position. 27Plaintiffintro duced
evidence that warnings and installation instructions could be developed that were
applicable to all potential users of the valve.25 In denying the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the court held that defendant's duty to provide the designer
and assembler of the stacking machine with such instructions and warnings should
be a question of fact, a matter for the jury.29 The basis of the court's holding was the
superior position of the defendant to acquire information about the dangers posed
by its valve.3" The court said that "[t]he responsibility for information collection and
dissemination should rest on the party who has the greatest
access to the
31
information and who can make it available at the lowest cost.
Under the Beauchamp approach, the air valve maker would be obligated to
discover and transmit safety information to the box stacker manufacturer, but the
latter manufacturer would be obligated to implement appropriate safety measures
in the finished product.
In contrast to Beauchamp,courts have consistently exonerated the manufacturer
of Teflon from a duty to assess and warn concerning its appropriateness for use in
medical implants. 32 This is eminently sensible because Teflon was developed for
industrial rather than medical purposes, and the manufacturer sold very small
quantities of Teflon to medical device manufacturers.33 The cost of researching the

safety of its product for medical uses would most likely have greatly outweighed
the income produced by sales for such purposes. Imposing the duty on the Teflon
manufacturer would have provided it with a strong incentive to refuse to sell Teflon
for any medical purpose, an undesirable result because it would foreclose all
medical uses, even those that prove to be desirable. A far better result is to place the
duty to research the efficacy of Teflon for medical uses on manufacturers of
medical products that use Teflon. If the research costs are justifiable because of the
potential benefits of using Teflon, these companies will conduct the research and
pass the costs on to the medical product users. Therefore, this approach does not
foreclose the desirable medical uses of products such as Teflon that were not
specifically designed for medical purposes.

27. Id. at 1195.
28. Id. at 1198
29. Beauchamp, 547 F. Supp. at 1197.
30. Id.

31. Id. at 1197.
32. The cases are discussed in Roubal, supra note 11. See also Edward M. Mansfield,
Reflections on CurrentLimits on Component and Raw MaterialSupplierLiability and the Proposed
Third Restatement, 84 Ky. L.J. 221,236-238 (1995-1996) (discussing Dupont's success at winning

summary judgments in its TMJ cases and the effect of that success on subsequent medical implant
cases).
33.

Klein v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 19 F.3d 997, 1002 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Of course, the Teflon manufacturer would be the cheapest cost avoider with
respect to detecting any risks associated with the intended uses of Teflon. That is,
it is appropriate for courts to require the manufacturer to test the product's efficacy
for industrial uses and to provide appropriate warnings and instructions to
downstream manufacturers that incorporate Teflon into their industrial and
consumer products.
In the illustrations discussed above, the notion that liability for failure to detect
a risk should be placed on the party best able to detect the risk and liability for
failure to protect against the risk should be placed on the party best able to prevent
it, is intuitive and easy to apply. Unfortunately, placing liability on the cheapest cost
avoider is not always a practical solution to deciding these cases. In some cases it
may not be so obvious that one party's detection or prevention costs are lower than
another's. Yet, in order to induce efficient behavior, the liability system would
require each manufacturer or supplier to act on an assessment, not only of its own
anticipated costs, but also the anticipated costs of other manufacturers.34
Furthermore, there is one joint-care case where optimal deterrence cannot be
achieved by imposing liability on the parties with the lowest detection and
prevention costs. This is the case "where the costs ofjoint prevention are greater,
and the minimum sum of detection and warning costs are less, than the expected
liability costs."3' According to Mr. Cunningham, this case can only be resolved
appropriately by a complex formula that would be impractical to implement in
practice. 36

34. Cunningham, supra note 17, at 555-556; Mansfield, supranote 32, at 245-246.
35. Cunningham, supranote 17, at 554-555. Mr. Cunningham explains why this is so:
If A is the cheaper detector and warner at $23, B the cheaper controller at $25,
and the expected liability is $35, A and B each will fulfill their duties to avoid
liability, but the total costs ofjoint care will exceed by $13 the expected liability.
Moreover, control costs need not beless than expected liability for misallocation
to occur. For example, if A and B faced the same costs as above, but expected
liability was $24, A would spend $23 to detect and warn while B would pay $24
for the accident rather than the $25 necessary to prevent it. The result: a total
social loss of $47.

Id. at 555.
36. Id. Mr.Cunningham describes the solution as follows:
To avoid these misallocations, a comparative cost system could be employed.
This approach would seek to determine each party's costs of detection, warning,
and control; to calculate the minimum joint cost of prevention; and to impose
liability on each party in an amount equal to the full liability judgment,
multiplied by the ratio of each party's minimum cost to the minimum joint
prevention costs. Whenever total liability exceeded joint prevention costs, A's
share of liability would exceed the sum of its detection and warning costs, and
B's share of liability would exceed its control costs. Each party therefore would
have an incentive to perform its role in preventing the defect. On the other hand,
whenever total liability was less than the costs ofjoint prevention, A's share of
liability would be less than the sum ofits detection and warning costs, B's share
would be less than its control costs, and neither party would try to prevent the
accident
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Because it is not practical to identify the cheapest cost avoider in every case,
it is obvious that the approach of imposing liability on the entity with the least
detection or prevention costs cannot be employed to resolve all cases. In addition,
even if that approach could always be implemented, it is not clear that courts would
always want to implement it. This is because economic analysis is probably not the
predominate explanation for the tort system.37 If cases arise where other policies
override the efficiency goal, it is appropriate for courts to implement those other
policies.
Probably the best approach is to view economic analysis as a tool that courts
should use when it is helpful and reject it when it is not. In this context, courts
should impose liability on the cheapest cost avoider when it is both practical to
identify that entity and when the efficiency goal coincides with the corrective
justice goal.
III. THE CASE LAW
Consistent with the idea of integrating the goals of efficiency and justice when
it is practical to do so, there are four common fact patterns that arise where courts
do impose liability on the component part supplier.38 In these cases, the component
supplier is both morally responsible for the harm and the entity that had either the
least detection costs or the least prevention costs. The first situation, as previously
discussed, is the case where the component part maker is also the designer of the
finished product.39 The second situation is where the defendant designs a
component that has only one use. Here, it is appropriate to require the manufacturer
to produce a product that is appropriate for that use.' Thus, in Fleck v. KDISylvan
Pools, Inc.,4 the court imposed liability on the manufacturer of a replacement liner
for an above-ground swimming pool because the liner lacked depth markers.42
Plaintiff was injured because he dove into the pool without knowing its depth. The
third situation is where the component has multiple uses, but it is dangerous for
most or all of them.43 Beauchamp v. Russell,' the air valve case, discussed
previously," provides an example. The fourth situation arises where a manufacturer
produces a component according to the designer's specifications of the finished
product, and the manufacturer has actual knowledge that the design is excessively
dangerous. Here, courts impose liability on the manufacturer for failing to adopt

37. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1806-07.
38. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 32, at 226-40 (discussing the different types of component
part cases and their relevant legal analyses).
39. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
40. Mansfield, supra note 32, at 229.
41. 981 F.2d 107 (3rd Cir. 1992).
42. Id. at 123; see also Mansfield, supra note 32, at 228-29 (discussing Fleck).
43. Mansfield, supra note 32, at 229-30.
44. 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
45. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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reasonable precautions. 4 In this situation there is an increased likelihood that the
manufacturer is the cheapest cost avoider because its detection costs are zero-it
already knew that the proposed design was dangerous.
In addition to the four fact patterns discussed above, additional situations arise
where imposing liability on the component part maker is appropriate. The most
insightful approach to identifying such cases was adopted by Verge v. FordMotor
Co.47 In that case Ford manufactured a truck chassis which was subsequently
modified by Leach and made into a garbage truck.4 s Plaintiffwas injured when the
truck backed into him.' He sued both Ford and Leach, claiming that the truck was
defective because it did not have a back-up alarm.5" The Verge court ruled that:
Where... the finished product is the result of substantial work by
more than one party, we must determine responsibility for the
absence of a safety device by looking primarily to at least three
factors:
1. Trade Custom-at what stage is that device
generally installed....
2. Relative expertise-which party is best acquainted
with the design problems and safety techniques in
question....
3. Practicality-at which stage is installation of device
most feasible... .1
The court exonerated Ford from liability on the basis that it was not feasible for
Ford to install the back-up alarm since the truck was a multi-use product, and a
backup alarm was not required for all uses. 2 Furthermore, Leach had more
expertise than Ford in producing garbage trucks.53 The case was not submissible to
the jury because the evidence pertaining to the three factors was insufficient to
justify a jury finding against Ford. 4
Other courts applying Verge have allowed the case against the component part
manufacturer to get to the jury. InMott v. CallahanAMS Machine Co., 5 plaintiff
was injured by the sharp edge of a steel coil being fed into a punch press that she
was operating.56 Callahan manufactured the punch press and purchased the stock
46. See, e.g., Orion Ins. Co., v. United Techs.Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(stating that a component manufacturer should not be liable unless the plans are so "obviously
dangerous that they should not reasonably be followed"); Mansfield, supra note 32, at 235.
47. 581 F.2d 384 (3rd Cir. 1978).
48. Id. at 387.
49. Id. at 385.
50. Id. at 386.
51. Id. at 386-387 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 388-89.
53. 581 F.2d at 388-89.
54. Id. at 389.
55. 416 A.2d 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
56. Id. at 58.
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reel and roll feed from the Cooper Weymouth Companies. 7 Callahan then attached
the roll feed to the press prior to shipping it and the stock reel to plaintiff's
employer.5 8 Plaintiff sued both Callahan and the Cooper Weymouth Companies
claiming the product was defective because it lacked a guard between the stock reel
and the roll feed that would have protected the plaintiff from the sharp edge of the
sheet metal being fed into the press. 9 Cooper Weymouth claimed that it had no
duty to provide a guard because its products are sometimes used to feed harmless
items such as cloth which does not require a guard." The court held that it was for
the jury to decide whether, on the basis of the three factors, Cooper Weymouth
should be held responsible for failing to provide a guard."
Courts have applied the Verge factors to failure to warn cases as well as design
defect cases.62 In Cross v. Cummins Engine Co.,6 the court applied the Verge
factors to the question of whether a manufacturer of a diesel truck engine can be
liable for failure to warn the purchaser of the engine of the necessity of equipping
the engine with a air intake shutoff valve if the truck is to be operated in an
environment containing volatile fumes. 64 In that case, the engine was installed for
use in a gasoline-tank truck. The design of the pump which transferred the
gasoline from the truck to the underground storage tank necessitated that the truck
engine be running while the tank was being unloaded, leaving the diesel engine
susceptible to combustion from gasoline vapors being sucked in through the
engine's air intake valves. 6 Plaintiff was injured by a fire that the shutoff valve
would allegedly have prevented. 7 The court decided, based on the Verge factors,
that factual issues existed as to whether the engine manufacturer was responsible
for warning of the defect.68
The genius of the Verge approach is that the factors of trade custom, expertise,
and practicality relate to both efficiency and fairness. If the component part
manufacturer has greater expertise than the assembler and if it is more practical for
the component part manufacturer to detect or to correct the danger, it is likely that
this manufacturer is the cheapest cost avoider. Furthermore, the existence of a
custom for the component part manufacturer to be responsible reinforces the

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 59.
61. Mott, 416 A.2d at 60-61.
62. See, e.g., Orion Ins. Co., v. United Techs. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(concluding that liability for design defects should rest with the assembler of the finished product).
63. 993 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1993).
64. Id. at 115-16.
65. Id. at 113.
66. Id. at 113-14.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 116.
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conclusion because custom reflects marketplace decisions based on experience. 9
Furthermore, the Verge factors are also relevant in fixing moral responsibility. It is
natural to fix blame on the basis of custom as well as on the basis that one party is
best able to prevent the accident.
Courts have adopted other approaches to analyzing component part
manufacturer liability, but none of them are as satisfactory as Verge. Many cases,
following the language of § 402A of the Second Restatement, analyze component
part cases in terms of whether the component part was defective when it left the
hands of the maker or whether the danger in the finished product resulted from
"further processing or substantial change" of the component part occurring by
virtue of its integration into the finished product.7" This approach is more helpful
as a way of stating a conclusion than as a way of reaching a conclusion. It is true
that sometimes this approach aids the analysis because a component part is
sometimes clearly defective. Take, for example, the flawed tire that causes a
blowout. Such a tire is defective, and the tire manufacturer is liable for the harm
caused by the blowout.7' But often the question of defect is not at all clear. Is a tire
defective because it has the wrong traction characteristics for a particular model of
SUV? Is a tire defective because it does not have a warning concerning the dangers
of mounting the tire on a multi-piece rim made by a different manufacturer?72 These
questions are much more readily answered by applying the three Verge factors than
by resolving the question of whether the tire has undergone a substantial change by
virtue of being mounted on the wheel of a vehicle.73 This especially true since
§ 402A of the Second Restatement gives no indication of when a change is
substantial.

69. Cunningham, supranote 17, at 562-563. Mr. Cunningham approves of Verge:
Viewed in light of the cheapest cost avoider test, trade custom might have
provided evidence of relative costs by showing how the market has allocated the
duty to install safety devices. The partmaker did not have the lowest detection
costs, for only the assembler could practically determine which units would
become garbage trucks. Expertise accounts forboth detection and control costs,
for the assembler chose the units for conversion and had exclusive control over
the conversion process.
Id. at 562-563 (footnote omitted).
70. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A provides in pertinent part that "[o]ne who sells
any product in a defective condition.., is subject to liability.., if... it is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFTORTS

§ 402A (1965); see also 2MADDEN

& OWEN ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY,

supranote

13, § 19:2, at 356-357 (supporting the statement in the text and citing numerous cases employing this
approach).
71. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
72. See Molino v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 617 A.2d 1235, 1240 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(imposing a duty to warn).
73. The unhelpfulness of the approach is illustrated by Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276
(Colo. 1978), which analyzes the question of whether the supplier of conveyor parts is liable for
failure to guard a nip point on the conveyor by asking whether the conveyor parts had undergone a
substantial change as a result of being incorporated in the finished product.
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Section 5 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability (Products
Liability Restatement)74 represents a great improvement over the Second
Restatement. It provides that a component part maker is liable either if the
component is defective in itself or if the seller of the component "substantially
participates" in the integration of the component into the design of the product, the
integration causes the product to be defective, and the defect causes harm." Unlike
the concept of "substantial change," the concept of "substantial participation" is
relevant to both the question of moral responsibility and the question of the costs
of accident avoidance. Participation in designing a product is a basis for imposing
moral responsibility. Participation is also relevant to the question of the costs of
accident prevention in that one who participates in designing a product has more
control over its dangerousness. Thus, he will, at least sometimes, be able to improve
the safety of the product at a lower cost than a person who has no control over its
design. In such cases he may well be the cheapest cost avoider. Conversely, when
a component part or raw material supplier does not substantially participate in the
design of the finished product, it will normally be far more burdensome for that
supplier to improve the safety of the finished product than it would be for the
assembler or designer of the product to do so. The comments to § 5 indicate that
the Products Liability Restatement drafters were heavily influenced by this
economic consideration.76

74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 (1998).
75. Section 5 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability provides:

One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product
components who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm
to persons or property caused by a product into which the component is
integrated if:
(a) the component is defective in itself, as defined in this Chapter, and the
defect causes the harm; or
(b)(1) the seller or distributor of the component substantially participates
in the integration of the component into the design of the product; and
(2) the integration of the component causes the product to be defective, as
defined in this Chapter; and
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.
Id.
76. Comment a to § 5 states:
As a general rule, component sellers should not be liable when the
component itself is not defective as defined in this Chapter. If the component is
not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely
on the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated product utilizes the
component in a manner that renders the integrated product defective. Imposing
liability would require the component seller to scrutinize another's product
which the component seller has no role in developing. This would require the
component seller to develop sufficient sophistication to review the decisions of
the business entity that is already charged with responsibility for the integrated
product.
Id. § 5 cmt. a.
In discussing the liability of raw material suppliers, comment c states:
The manufacturer of the integrated product has a significant comparative
advantage regarding selection of materials to be used. Accordingly, raw-
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However, the "substantial participation" requirement is probably not as useful
as the three Verge factors in identifying which party should be responsible for
protecting against product risks. Buonanno v. ColmarBelting Co.77 illustrates the
limitations of the substantial participation requirement. InBuonanno,a worker was
injured when his arm was caught in an unguarded "nip point" of a conveyor system
at the place where the belt met the wing pulley." The conveyor system was
constructed by a welding contractor.79 Colmar was informed of the desired length,
width, speed and motor type for the conveyor; it then determined what parts were
needed to build the system, obtained the parts from manufacturers of its choice, and
supplied the parts to the contractor." Colmar did not provide or recommend a shield
for the nip point, and the contractor failed to fabricate a shield for the nip point even
though the danger was generally known and a shield was required by Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations."' Plaintiff sued Colmar and
the manufacturer of the wing pulley, claiming that the conveyor was defective
because it lacked a shield at the nip point and because it lacked a warning. 2
Applying § 5 of the ProductsLiability Restatement, the appellate court affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the wing pulley manufacturer on the basis that it did
not participate in the design process; the court reversed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Colmar on the basis that the jury could find that Colmar was
liable because it did substantially participate in design of the finished product.8 3
The decision in favor of the wing pulley manufacturer is clearly justifiable.
That manufacturer's lack ofparticipationinthe design of the conveyor suggests that
it would have been much more costly for it to have provided either the shield or the
warning than for the contractor to have done so. The court's decision to submit the
case against Colmar to the jury is more difficult to justify. Colmar claims that it was
not feasible for it to provide the shield for the wing pulley because such shields
must be custom made by the contractor at the job site. 4 If this allegation is true,
then the contractor, not Colmar, is the party that can provide the shield at the lowest
cost. Holding Colmar liable for failure to provide the shield, simply because it
participated in the design, wouldbe difficult to justify. The Verge court wouldhave
taken feasibility, expertise, and custom into account in determining whether

materials sellers are not subject to liability for harm caused by defective design
of the end-product. The same considerations apply to failure-to-warn claims
against sellers of raw materials. To impose a duty to warn would require the
seller to develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and
to investigate the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over whom the
supplier has no control.
Id. § 5 cmt. c.
77. 733 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1999).
78. Id. at 713 & n.1.
79. Id. at714
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 715-20.
84. Id. at 714.
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plaintiff is entitled to ajury trial against Colmar on this issue. It is not clear from the
Buonanno opinion that the plaintiff had sufficient evidence to survive a motion for
summaryjudgment on this issue by Colmar in ajurisdiction applying the Verge test.
The point is that while the "substantial participation" requirement is relevant,
it is not necessarily controlling. If Colmar was powerless to shield the nip point it
should not be held liable for failure to do so even though it did participate in the
design of the conveyor system. The converse is also true. Cases like Beauchamp
(the air valve warning defect case) and Mott (the roll feed design defect case)
illustrate that manufacturers of generally dangerous components should be required
to provide appropriate guards, warnings, and instructions even when they do not
participate in the design of the finished product."
The holdings in cases like Beauchamp andMottare not necessarily inconsistent
with the ProductsLiabilityRestatement. While neither manufacturer could be held
liable under § 5(b), because neither manufacturer substantially participated in the
integration of its component, it is possible that both could be liable under § 2, in the
former case because of a warning defect and in the latter case because of a design
defect. The role of § 2 in determining the liability of component part manufacturers
is demonstrated, for example, by comparing Illustrations 3 and 4 in § 5. Illustration
3, based on the swimming pool liner case previously discussed,86 finds the liner
manufacturer liable if a liner without depth markings is "defectively designed for
all swimming pool installations."87 Illustration 4 finds that the supplier of bulk
foam, with multiple uses, is not liable for failure to warn about the risks of using the
foam to manufacture disposable dishware 8" In the illustration both the foam
manufacturer and the dishware manufacturer are aware of the potential danger.8 9
Courts applying the ProductsLiabilityRestatement will probably seldom hold
a component part or a raw material supplier liable on the basis that it substantially
participated in the integration of the component into the design. Such participation
rarely occurs. The heavy work of resolving component part manufacturer liability
is done by applying § 2 to determine whether the component has a design or a
warning defect. Section 2 provides little guidance for resolving the defect issue in
this context, but the comments and illustrations to § 5 do provide some helpful
guidance. Unfortunately, this guidance is incomplete because it does not include
the three Verge factors. Courts adopting the ProductsLiabilityRestatementwill be
greatly aided in resolving the defect question in component part and raw material

cases by considering those factors. The factors are particularly useful for allocating
design and warning responsibility among finished product assemblers and
component part and raw material suppliers.

85. See supranotes 23-31 and 55-61 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 5 cmt. b, illus. 3 (1998).
88. Id. § 5 cmt. b, illus. 4.
89. Id.
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IV. A WORD ABOUT WARNINGS
Courts frequently determine the warning obligations ofcomponent part makers
by applying the "bulk supplier/sophisticatedpurchaser" rule.9" This rule exonerates
the supplier from having to warn the end user if it gives an adequate warning to the
fabricator of the finished product. In determining whether the supplier is exempt
from having to warn the end user, courts consider such factors as:
(1) [T]he dangerous condition of the product; (2) the purpose for
which the product is used; (3) the form of any warnings given; (4)
the reliability of the third party as a conduit of necessary
information about the product; (5) the magnitude of the risk
involved; and (6) the burdens imposed on the supplier by
requiring that he directly warn all users.91
The sixth factor in this rule reflects the idea that the cheapest cost avoider should
have the obligation to warn end users. That is, if the burden of warning is high, the
component supplier is probably not the party that can most feasibly convey the
warning to the end user.
However, the doctrine is not entirely adequate to cope with the complexities of
the issue under consideration. The doctrine rests on the premise that the supplier
must always warn the assembler of the final product ofrisks that the supplier knows
about or could discover. Yet, as the Teflon cases illustrate,92 foreseeability by itself
is not sufficient to impose a duty to warn.93 Thus, the Verge factors provide a more
satisfactory basis for determining the warning obligations of component part
suppliers than does the bulk supplier/sophisticated purchaser rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts are appropriately reluctant to impose either design or warning
obligations on suppliers of component parts and raw materials. Yet, there are cases
where such obligations are justified because the tort policies of efficiency and
fairness coalesce to suggest that the obligation should be imposed. With respect to

90. Madden, supranote 20, at 565-66.
91. Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 557 (W.D. Va. 1984). The factors listed by
the court are derived from comment n to § 388 of the Second Restatement. The doctrine is also
embodied in the ProductsLiabilityRestatement. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LLIiTY §2cmt. i (1998).
92. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.

93. Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1F.3d 701, 706-07 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that
replacement chain supplier is not required to warn about a foreseeable risk.); Childress v. Gresen Mfg.
Co., 888 F.2d 45,49 (6th Cir. 1989) (determining that hydraulic valve manufacturer not required to
warn about a foreseeable risk); Mansfield, supranote 32, at 225-26; see also Madden, supranote 20,
at 565 (stating that imposing a duty to warn on component part makers is often unjustifiable unless
the product's appropriate use is well-defined).
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four categories of cases, liability can be imposed routinely, but there are cases not
falling within those categories where liability is also justified. The Verge test
represents the most coherent approach to identifying those cases. By looking at
custom, expertise, and practicality courts can identify instances where component
suppliers should be liable because they are best able either to discover or to protect
against the finished product's harm.
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